Is factuality a matter of content?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-763 (1999)
Dienes & Perner argue that there is a hierarchy of forms of implicit knowledge. One level of their hierarchy involves factuality, where it may be merely implicit that the state of affairs is supposed to be a real one rather than something imagined or fictional. I argue that the factual or fictional status of a thought or utterance cannot be a matter of concept, implicit or explicit.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X99312188
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