Graduate studies at Western
Inquiry 26 (3):345 – 359 (1983)
|Abstract||Two claims the present author has made about Frege's philosophy are defended against Michael Dummett's criticisms (The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy and ?Objectivity and Reality in Lotze and Frege?, this journal, 1982). The claim that Frege was concerned primarily with epistemological problems rather than with the theory of meaning, and the claim (this journal, 1978) that the ascription of Wirklichkeit to Thoughts is evidence of Frege's realism, are clarified and defended. Dummett's own characterization of Frege's realism is considered and rejected|
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