I. interpreting Frege: A reply to Michael Dummett

Inquiry 26 (3):345 – 359 (1983)
Two claims the present author has made about Frege's philosophy are defended against Michael Dummett's criticisms (The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy and ?Objectivity and Reality in Lotze and Frege?, this journal, 1982). The claim that Frege was concerned primarily with epistemological problems rather than with the theory of meaning, and the claim (this journal, 1978) that the ascription of Wirklichkeit to Thoughts is evidence of Frege's realism, are clarified and defended. Dummett's own characterization of Frege's realism is considered and rejected
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1979). Sinning Against Frege. Philosophical Review 88 (3):398-432.
Gregory Currie (1982). Frege, Sense and Mathematical Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5 – 19.
Gregory Currie (1978). Ii. Frege's Realism. Inquiry 21 (1-4):218 – 221.
Michael Dummett (1982). Realism. Synthese 52 (1):145--165.
Citations of this work BETA
Karen Green (1986). Psychologism and Anti-Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):488 – 500.
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