David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 13 (1):35-55 (1998)
I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to pretending as truth stands to belief
|Keywords||Belief Language Pretension Representation|
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Pierre Jacob (2008). What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition? Mind and Language 23 (2):190–223.
Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy (2003). What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality. Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.
Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.
Dustin Stokes (2009). Aesthetics and Cognitive Science. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.
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