Pretence, pretending, and metarepresenting

Mind and Language 13 (1):35-55 (1998)
Abstract
I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to pretending as truth stands to belief
Keywords Belief  Language  Pretension  Representation
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