Some Inconclusive Reasons Against 'Conclusive Reasons'

Philosophy Research Archives 9:293-302 (1983)
In, “Some Conclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’”, Pappas and Swain have criticized Dretske’s theory that conclusive reasons are necessary for knowledge. In their view this condition is too strong. They attempt to show this by means of two purported counterexamples: the cup-hologram case and the generator case. This paper defends Dretske’s analysis against these challenges
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DOI 10.5840/pra1983928
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