The Constraints General Relativity Places on Physicalist Accounts of Causality

Theoria 15 (1):33-58 (2000)
Abstract
All accounts of causality that presuppose the propagation or transfer or some physical stuff to be an essential part of the causal relation rely for the force of their causal claims on a principle of conservation for that stuff. General Relativity does not permit the rigorous formulation of appropriate conservation principles. Consequently, in so far as General Relativity is considered and fundamental physical theory, such accounts of causality cannot be considered fundamental. The continued use of such accounts of causality ought not be proscribed, but justification is due from those who would use them
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Roger Jones (1980). Is General Relativity Generally Relativistic? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:363 - 381.
    Jon Williamson (2009). Probabilistic Theories of Causality. In Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press. 185--212.
    Jules Vuillemin (forthcoming). Physicalism and Relativity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 16:313-326.
    Joel Hunter, Time Travel. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    C. Hoefer (2000). Energy Conservation in GTR. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 31 (2):187-199.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-01-09

    Total downloads

    48 ( #28,739 of 1,088,854 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    11 ( #10,075 of 1,088,854 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.