Content, embodiment, and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails

Mind 101 (404):651-88 (1992)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Cognitive  Metaphysics  Reference  Representation  Thought  nonconceptual content  cognitive trails  perception
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DOI 10.1093/mind/101.404.651
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Joëlle Proust (2008). Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
Josefa Toribio (2007). Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
Adrian Cussins (2012). Environmental Representation of the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.

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