On an aristotelian theory of universals

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):51 – 58 (1979)
A theory purporting to solve the problem of universals must be able to explain predication, recurrence, and classification. How Platonism does this is well known. Here I take a hard look at an attempt by M.J. Cresswell to give an Aristotelian answer and show it to be a complete and utter failure. The answer does not eliminate commitment to universals and it is only half an answer anyway because it does not cover relational predicates, an omission that Russell noted dooms answers by other philosophers as well.
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DOI 10.1080/00048407912341031
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
H. H. Price (1954). Thinking and Experience. Philosophical Review 63 (1):93-98.
Irving M. Copi (1954). Essence and Accident. Journal of Philosophy 51 (23):706-719.
M. J. Cresswell (1975). What is Aristotle's Theory of Universals? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):238 – 247.

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