David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Margaret A. Boden (ed.), The Philosophy of Ai. Oxford University Press (1990)
The character of computational modelling of cognition depends on an underlying theory of representation. Classical cognitive science has exploited the syntax/semantics theory of representation that derives from logic. But this has had the consequence that the kind of psychological explanation supported by classical cognitive science is " _conceptualist_: " psychological phenomena are modelled in terms of relations that hold between concepts, and between the sensors/effectors and concepts. This kind of explanation is inappropriate for the Proper Treatment of Connectionism
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Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). The Phenomenal Content of Experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
José Luis Bermúdez (1995). Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States. Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.
Jose Luis Bermudez (1995). Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States. Mind and Language 10 (4):333-69.
Simone Gozzano (2008). In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content. Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
Douglas B. Meehan (2002). Qualitative Character and Sensory Representation. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):630-641.
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