Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):173-188 (2013)
Abstract
In the debate on free will and moral responsibility, Saul Smilansky is a hard source-incompatibilist who objects to source-compatibilism for being morally shallow. After criticizing John Martin Fischer’s too optimistic response to this objection, this paper dissipates the charge that compatibilist accounts of ultimate origination are morally shallow by appealing to the seriousness of contingency in the framework of, what Paul Russell calls, compatibilist-fatalism. Responding to the objection from moral shallowness thus drives a wedge between optimists and fatalists within the compatibilist camp.
Keywords Compatibilism  Fatalism  John Martin Fischer  Incompatibilism  Paul Russell  Saul Smilansky  Ultimate origination
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Andrew C. Khoury (2014). Manipulation and Mitigation. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):283-294.
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