David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):349-368 (1998)
There is something deeply wrong with the debate on personal identity in contemporary analytical philosophy. This paper offers an overall view in terms of which this debate can be diagnosed and offered a therapy. In the diagnostic sections, the bundle and ego-theory are described as forms of the selfsame philosophical atomism, and the untenability of one strand in this still highly influential habit of thought is demonstrated. In the therapeutic section, the author exposes in what way Peter Strawson's descriptive metaphysics of the person contains the essential preliminaries for an alternative solution. In the concluding section, it is indicated how such a Strawsonian nonatomistic view can be developed further into an Aristotelian-Thomistic validatory metaphysics of personal identity
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