A model theoretic approach to 'natural' reasoning

Abstract
Abstract A general framework is proposed for accommodating the recent results of studies into ?natural? decision making. A crucial element of this framework is the notion of a ?partial structure?, recently introduced into the semantic approach to scientific theories. It is through the introduction of this element that connections can be made with certain problems regarding inconsistency and rationality in general
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References found in this work BETA
Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French (1989). On the Logic of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3):431 - 446.
Newton C. A. Da Costa & Steven French (1989). Pragmatic Truth and the Logic of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):333-356.

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Citations of this work BETA
O. Bueno (2000). Empiricism, Scientific Change and Mathematical Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):269-296.
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Newton C. A. Costdaa & Steven French (1993). A Model Theoretic Approach to 'Natural' Reasoning. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):177 – 190.
Steven French & James Ladyman (1999). Reinflating the Semantic Approach. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):103 – 121.
Jeremy Avigad (2002). Saturated Models of Universal Theories. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 118 (3):219-234.
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