The Epistemological Liar

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):125-144 (2003)
Is it possible truthfully to assert the non-existence of truth? It is a classical problem whose solution is still controversial. I present here an analysis of the sentence “there is no truth” (and its translations and paraphrases, such as “no proposition is true”, “every proposition is false”), with some remarks about its epistemological and ontological implications, and its consequences tor a general theory of reason
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DOI croatjphil20033211
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