Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bo Dahlbom (ed.)
Daniel Dennett is arguably one of the most influential yet radical philosophers in America today. In this volume, Dennett is confronted by colleagues and critics, from philosophy, biology and psychology. His reply constitutes an extensive essay which clarifies, and develops further, central themes in his philosophy. The debate ranges over Dennett's whole corpus, but special attention is given to his major work on consciousness, Consciousness Explained. The volume includes a critical assessement of Dennett's views on behaviouralism and the subjectivity of consciousness, the nature of perception and mental representation, intentional laws and computational psychology, the rationality of thought, culture as a virus, the architecture of mind, and the role of artifacts in thinking. Also included is an introduction to Dennett's philosophy and a full bibliography of his publications
|Keywords||Consciousness Mind and body Intentionality (Philosophy|
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|Buy the book||$4.99 used (91% off) $25.00 new (49% off) $51.95 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B945.D394.D46 1993|
|ISBN(s)||0631185496 0631196781 9780631196785|
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Citations of this work BETA
David J. Chalmers (forthcoming). Referentialism and the Objects of Credence: A Reply to Braun. Mind:fzv111.
Sean Allen-Hermanson (2015). Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A Case Study. Erkenntnis 80 (1):57-76.
C. T. A. Schmidt & F. Kraemer (2006). Robots, Dennett and the Autonomous: A Terminological Investigation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 16 (1):73-80.
Marc Champagne (2009). Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification. Dialogue 48 (1):145-183.
Robert J. Howell (2007). The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.
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