The experience of time and change
Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638 (2008)
| Abstract | Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, a largely schematic examination of the main options is conducted, with a view to determining the most promising avenues for further investigation. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Peter K. McInerney (1991). Time and Experience. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Michael Pelczar (2010). Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63.
D. H. Mellor (1981). Real Time. Cambridge University Press.
Sean Enda Power (2010). Complex Experience, Relativity and Abandoning Simultaneity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):231-256.
Sebastian Watzl (2012). Silencing the Experience of Change. Philosophical Studies.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads175 ( #1,789 of 549,006 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,082 of 549,006 )How can I increase my downloads? |

