The gaze of consciousness

Abstract
According to one influential view, consciousness has an awareness– content structure: any experience consists of the awareness of some content. I focus on one version of this dualism, and argue that it should be rejected. My principal argument is directed at the status of the supposed contents of aware- ness; I argue that neither of the principal options is tenable, albeit for different reasons. Although the doctrine in question may seem to be supported by the find- ings of researchers in meditative traditions, I question whether this evidence sup- ports the dualism that is my target here. To conclude, I introduce an innocuous mode of pure awareness
Keywords Awareness  Consciousness  Content  Gaze  Metaphysics  Phenomenology
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Citations of this work BETA
Evan Thompson (2007). Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
Oliver Rashbrook (2013). The Continuity of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):611-640.

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Similar books and articles
A. Delkman (1996). I = Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):350-356.
David Woodruff Smith (2005). Consciousness with Reflexive Content. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Galen Strawson (2015). Self-Intimation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
Pessi Lyyra (2009). Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.

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