Unity and introspectibility: Reply to Gilmore
Psyche 10 (1) (2004)
| Abstract | Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesCody Gilmore (2010). Coinciding Objects and Duration Properties: Reply to Eagle. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 5. Oxford University Press.
David Carrier (1995). Reply to Jonathan Gilmore. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (4):426-429.
Jonathan Gilmore (1995). Reply to Carrier. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53 (4):429.
Yuri Balashov (2005). Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts: A Reply to Gilmore. Philosophical Studies 124 (1):1 - 40.
Cody Gilmore (2009). Why Parthood Might Be a Four-Place Relation, and How It Behaves If It Is. In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. de Gruyter.
Norton Nelkin (1993). What is Consciousness? Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34.
Seahwa Kim (2011). On Gilmore's Definition of 'Dead'. Philosophia 39 (1):105-110.
Cody S. Gilmore (2003). The Introspectibility Thesis. Psyche 9 (5).
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