Fictionalism and the attitudes

Philosophical Studies 139 (3):423 - 440 (2008)
Abstract
This paper distinguishes revolutionary fictionalism from other forms of fictionalism and also from other philosophical views. The paper takes fictionalism about mathematical objects and fictionalism about scientific unobservables as illustrations. The paper evaluates arguments that purport to show that this form of fictionalism is incoherent on the grounds that there is no tenable distinction between believing a sentence and taking the fictionalist's distinctive attitude to that sentence. The argument that fictionalism about mathematics is ‘comically immodest’ is also evaluated. In place of those arguments, an argument against fictionalism about abstract objects of any kind is presented in the last section. This argument takes the form of a trilemma against the fictionalist.
Keywords Fictionalism  Belief  Acceptance
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
    Simon Blackburn (2003). Fiction and Conviction. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):243-260.
    John P. Burgess (2004). Mathematics and Bleak House. Philosophia Mathematica 12 (1):18-36.

    View all 19 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Frederick Kroon (2011). Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):786-803.
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    110 ( #7,432 of 1,088,426 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    2 ( #42,750 of 1,088,426 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.