The methodology of genuine modal realism

Synthese 162 (1):37 - 52 (2008)
Abstract
David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors.
Keywords Lewis  Modal realism  Chihara  Cameron  Shalkowski  Question-begging  Epistemology  Circularity
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    References found in this work BETA
    John Divers (1997). The Analysis of Possibility and the Possibility of Analysis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):141–160.
    Alvin Plantinga (1979). De Essentia. Grazer Philosophische Studien 7:101-121.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Sam Cowling (2013). Ideological Parsimony. Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.
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