Report a bug on this page | Sign in | Create an account
 
PhilPapers home blank

Online research in philosophy


Entries: 207,596  New this week: 127
blank
 General search   Category finder 
advanced search | help | use + and * as usual.
Type words to match in category names
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?

Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.

  • Chris Daly (1998). What Are Physical Properties? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):196-217.
    Formulating Physicalism in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar
    24 downloads  |  Added to index:2009-01-27  |  Mark as duplicate |  Delete from index


Discussion of Chris Daly, What are physical properties?
Other forums | There are no threads in this forum | Start a new thread First post Latest post Total
Nothing in this forum yet.


Similar books and articles
  • 77.1David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used in different senses (...) in the principles. In (1) and (3), 'properties' should be read as 'tropes' (properties here are particulars), while in (2) 'properties' should read as 'types' (properties here are universals or classes). Although mental types are distinct from physical types, every mental trope is a physical trope. This allows mental properties to be causally relevant to physical effects without violating the closed character of the physical world. (shrink)
    Tropes in Metaphysics
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 72.8Tim Crane (2001). The Significance of Emergence. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent properties’ of physical entities. Yet many non-reductive physicalists have denied this. In what follows, I examine their denial, and I argue that on a plausible (...) understanding of what ‘emergent’ means, the denial is indefensible: non-reductive physicalism is committed to mental properties being emergent properties. It follows that the problems for emergentism—especially the problems of mental causation—are also problems for non-reductive physicalism, and they are problems for the same reason. (shrink)
    Emergence in Metaphysics
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ucl.ac.uk web.mac.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 71.9Andrew Melnyk (1996). Formulating Physicalism: Two Suggestions. Synthese 105 (3):381-407.
    Two ways are considered of formulating a version of retentive physicalism, the view that in some important sense everything is physical, even though there do exist properties, e.g. higher-level scientific ones, which cannot be type-identified with physical properties. The first way makes use of disjunction, but is rejected on the grounds that the results yield claims that are either false or insufficiently materialist. The second way, realisation physicalism, appeals to the correlative notions of a functional property and its realisation, and (...) states, roughly, that any actual property whatsoever is either itself a physical property or else is, ultimately, realised by instances of physical properties. Realisation physicalism is distinctive since it makes no claims of identity whatsoever, and involves no appeal to the dubious concept of supervenience. After an attempt to formulate realisation physicalism more precisely, I explore a way in which, in principle, we could obtain evidence of its truth. (shrink)
    Formulating Physicalism in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 71.4Robert Schroer (forthcoming). How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach? American Philosophical Quarterlly.
    : It is widely thought that dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties; specifying the nature of this dependency, however, has proven a difficult task. The dependency of dispositional properties upon categorical properties also presents a challenge to the thesis of Physicalism: If the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects they study and if dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties, then it appears that there will be kind of property—categorical properties—that will escape description by the (...) physical sciences. This paper argues that a new theory of dispositional and categorical properties, a theory put forth by C.B. Martin and John Heil, solves both of these problems: It presents a way of understanding the sense in which dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties that has major advantages over more popular accounts of this dependency and it also provides a new and interesting Physicalist response to the challenge presented by categorical properties. (shrink)
    Formulating Physicalism in Philosophy of Mind
    Dispositional and Categorical Properties in Metaphysics
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 71.1Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization. Erkenntnis 67 (2).
    Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including (...) analytical filler-functionalism for mental properties, and the assumption that causes must be proportional to their effects. I conclude by pointing out that Shoemaker has provided no explanation of why, on his view, certain physical properties entail mental properties. (shrink)
    Realization in Metaphysics
    In my reading list   |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 69.8Janez Bregant (2004). Van Gulick's Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited. Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
    The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and (...) beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept. (shrink)
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: transactionpub.metapress.com springerlink.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 68.8R. B. Miller (1990). Supervenience is a Two-Way Street. Journal of Philosophy 87 (12):695-701.
    Supervenience, General in Metaphysics
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • 68.5Douglas E. Ehring (2003). Part-Whole Physicalism and Mental Causation. Synthese 136 (3):359-388.
    A well-known ``overdetermination''argument aims to show that the possibility of mental causes of physical events in a causally closed physical world and the possibility of causally relevant mental properties are both problematic. In the first part of this paper, I extend an identity reply that has been given to the first problem to a property-instance account of causal relata. In the second, I argue that mental types are composed of physical types and, as a consequence, both mental and physical types (...) may be causally relevant with respect to the same physical effect, contrary to the overdetermination argument. In further sections, I argue that mental types have causal powers, consider some objections and reject an alternative version of part-whole physicalism. Throughout I assume that causal relata are tropes and property types are classes of tropes. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: kluweronline.com springerlink.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 68.0Gabriel Segal, Content and Causation.
    Allow me to recapitulate some territory that will be familiar to most readers. Here is how the problem of mental causation has typically been set up since shortly after the onset of non-reductive physicalism. It is now widely assumed that the realm of the physical is causally closed: every physical event has a complete physical cause, a cause that is sufficient for the event’s occurrence. This apparently leaves us with a limited number of options concerning psychological causation, none of which (...) appear hugely attractive. Either: (a) the psychological is epiphenomenal and can have no causal impact on the physical, or (b) the psychological is identical with the physical, or (c) thoughts and actions are all over-determined, each one having two distinct sufficient causes. Option (b) subdivides into two further options. Either (b1) the psychological reduces to the physical and every psychological property is identical with some physical property, or (b2) token psychological events are identical with or constituted from token physical events but psychological properties are not identical with physical properties. (b1) is widely held to be inconsistent with the multiple realisation of the psychological by the physical. And (b2) appears to bring us back to the original problematic, with the properties as the locus of tension. If one event causes another it does so in virtue some of its properties and not others. If I throw a stone at a window and the window breaks, it is because the stone was hard and heavy that it broke the window and not, say, because it was grey and millions of years old. The properties in virtue of which an event has a particular effect are typically called the ‘causally efficacious properties of the cause with respect to the effect.’ Suppose, then that token neural event causes an action. We can ask ‘Does it do so in virtue of its physical properties or its psychological properties?’ and we are back to choosing between options (a) and (c) or returning to (b1).. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 66.1Benedikt Paul Göcke (2009). What is Physicalism? Ratio 22 (3):291-307.
    Although 'most contemporary analytic philosophers [endorse] a physicalist picture of the world' (A. Newen; V. Hoffmann; M. Esfeld, 'Preface to Mental Causation, Externalism and Self-Knowledge', Erkenntnis , 67 (2007), p. 147), it is unclear what exactly the physicalist thesis states. The response that physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical does not solve the problem but is a precise statement of the problem because 'the claim is hopelessly vague' (G. Hellman; F. Thompson, 'Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction', Journal of (...) Philosophy , 72 (1975), p. 552). I argue that physicalism in fact should be the thesis that every existing particular essentially exemplifies properties the exemplification of which does not conceptually entail the existence of conscious beings. Physicalism thus is a purely philosophical thesis with no intrinsic relation to physics. 1. (shrink)
    Formulating Physicalism in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..




  • Applied ethicsEpistemologyMeta-ethicsMetaphysicsNormative ethics
    Philosophy of biologyPhilosophy of languagePhilosophy of mindPhilosophy of religionMore ...
    Home | Blog | New books and articles | Philosophy journals | Forums | The Categorization Project | About PhilPapers | Contact us
    Sponsored by the Joint Information Systems Committee as part of the
    Information Environment Programme

    Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
    All rights reserved by David Bourget and David Chalmers where applicable.

    loading ..