Are There Ultimately Founded Propositions?

Universitas Philosophica 54 (54):163-177 (2010)
Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according to which such propositions are necessary. In this short essay I show that under the premise of modal logic S5 with constant domain there are ultimately founded propositions and that their existence is even necessary, and I will give some reasons for the superiority of S5 over other logics.
Keywords classical foundationalism  ultimate justification  transcendental arguments  self-refutation  proposition  the absolute  skepticism  modal logic S5  modal proof  infallibility
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