David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):275-292 (2011)
In this paper, I present a general profile of individuals with psychopathy, autism, and acquired sociopathy as well as look specifically at the abilities of these individuals with respect to the moral domain. These individuals are individually and collectively interesting because of their significant affective and social impairments. I argue that none of these individuals should be considered full moral agents based on a proposed account of moral agency consisting of the following two necessary conditions: (1) the capacity for moral judgment and (2) the capacity for moral motivation. Since each of these groups of individuals fails to satisfy the criteria in a different way, these arguments help to distinguish three primary ways in which emotion contributes to moral motivation. I conclude with a suggested general implication of this discussion for related debates in moral theory.
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith (1985). Does the Autistic Child Have a “Theory of Mind”? Cognition 21 (1):37-46.
R. Blair (1995). A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath. Cognition 57 (1):1-29.
Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
Jesse J. Prinz (2006). The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.
Adina Roskies (2003). Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From "Acquired Sociopathy&Quot;. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):51 – 66.
Citations of this work BETA
Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Kim Lützén & Beatrice Ewalds Kvist (2012). Moral Distress: A Comparative Analysis of Theoretical Understandings and Inter-Related Concepts. [REVIEW] HEC Forum 24 (1):13-25.
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