David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan 45--58 (2010)
For many, the paradigm of a deflationary theory of truth is the redundancy theory, which is typically taken to consist of two claims: namely (i) that sentences containing the truth predicate are synonymous with sentences not containing the truth predicate (and so the truth predicate is redundant) and (ii) that there is no property of truth.1 The redundancy theory is not an attractive theory of truth since neither of its claims is particularly plausible on its own, and the combination of the two claims is, if not actually inconsistent, at least uncomfortable.2 Very few deflationists nowadays endorse either part of the theory.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jeremy Wyatt (forthcoming). The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv085.
Jamin Asay (2014). Against Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.
Douglas Edwards (2013). Truth as a Substantive Property. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.
Jeremy Wyatt (2013). Domains, Plural Truth, and Mixed Atomic Propositions. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):225-236.
Andrea Strollo (2013). Deflationism and the Invisible Power of Truth. Dialectica 67 (4):521-543.
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