David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In this paper, I attempt to look at the differential (as in interventionist) readings undertaken by speculative realists (A school of contemporary thought reacting against post-Kantian 'Correlationism') Iain Hamilton Grant and Ray Brassier, with the former concentrating on reading Schelling's naturalism relating to reason, while the latter claiming the constancy of thought's connection to thought. For Brassier, thought must be transcendentally separate from nature, or what he calls 'exteriority', and Grant insists on nature's thinking as plain nature. This doesn't mean 'interiority' is given weight in Grant's thought, but, on the contrary isn't a concern, as for him, the limiting factor of thinking (dichotomy in subject-object relationality) is the regionality of a particular identity attempting to grasp nature's infintude. Brassier maintains scientific statements as capable of supplying reasons for believing in the possibilities of determining thought's tracking and missing nature. He accomplishes this by clarifying notions of concept and distinguishing objects from concepts. This alien-ness of thought generates the possibilities of questioning the human production as against nature. This cardinal issue tries to answer the repercussions probably generated in the wake of either apathetic aspects of mind or the deepest powers of speculation. Not only that, a simultaneous questioning of the legitimacy of ontology and epistemology in the natural world is encountered. Grant advocates the objectifying of the self to grasp the productivity of self's thinking, but at the same time considering objectifying as an ongoing process, a kind of 'becoming'. In other words, it is the questioning of the limits of 'being' in the creation of episteme that takes precedence in Grant. Brassier on the other hand is concerned with the doing away of the dichotomy of being and thinking of meaning. This tension raises the issue of nature philosophy in a duel of 'eliminativism' and 'materialism', between the extent that calls for grounding nature without reliance on a structure undermining the discovery of contemporary science or supporting an anthropic view.
|Keywords||Correlationism Iain Hamilton Grant Quentin Meillassoux Ray Brassier Ray Brassier Philosophy of Nature|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ray Brassier & Marcin Rychter (2011). I Am a Nihilist Because I Still Believe in Truth. Kronos (March).
Knox Peden (2010). Ray Brassier: Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 42 (4):583-589.
Clayton Crockett (2012). Quentin Meillassoux: After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, Trans. Ray Brassier. London and New York: Continuum, 2008, $27.95 (Hb); $19.95 (Pb). Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, Viii and 247 Pp. $110.00 (Hb); $32.00 (Pb). [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (3):251-255.
Ray Brassier (2011). Concepts and Objects. In Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek & Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism. Re.Press
Iain Hamilton Grant (2011). Does Nature Stay What-It-Is?: Dynamics and the Antecedence Criterion. In Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek & Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism. Re.Press
Joseph P. Lawrence (2007). Review of Iain Hamilton Grant, On an Artificial Earth: Philosophies of Nature After Schelling. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5).
Added to index2010-01-17
Total downloads55 ( #44,654 of 1,699,807 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #57,594 of 1,699,807 )
How can I increase my downloads?