David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The most important contemporary debate in the theory of truth is that between inflationists and deflationists.1 But although the debate is of fundamental importance, we do not have a clear, unproblematic formulation of the difference between the two camps. Part of the reason for this is that contemporary deflationists have given up many of the distinctive positions that their predecessors endorsed: typically, they no longer claim that the truth predicate is redundant, that there is no property of truth, or that ‘true’ is not a predicate.2 While the desire to eschew these claims is understandable, doing so has made it more difficult to identify any difference between deflationists and inflationists, and the debate, particularly between deflationists and correspondence theorists, sometimes appears to evaporate. Perhaps in response to this worry, contemporary deflationists have adopted a range of new and distinctive deflationary claims about truth. Yet, as a number of critics have pointed out, many of these new positions are equally as implausible as those of earlier deflationists.
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