The chinese room argument--dead but not yet buried

Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):159-169 (2004)
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Abstract

This article is an accompaniment to Anthony Freeman’s review of Views into the Chinese Room, reflecting on some pertinent outstanding questions about the Chinese room argument. Although there is general agreement in the artificial intelligence community that the CRA is somehow wrong, debate continues on exactly why and how it is wrong. Is there a killer counter-argument and, if so, what is it? One remarkable fact is that the CRA is prototypically a thought experiment, yet it has been very little discussed from the perspective of thought experiments in general. Here, I argue that the CRA fails as a thought experiment because it commits the fallacy of undersupposing, i.e., it leaves too many details to be filled in by the audience. Since different commentators will often fill in details differently, leading to different opinions of what constitutes a decisive counter, the result is 21-plus years of inconclusive debate

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Nixin' goes to china.Larry Hauser - 2003 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. pp. 123--143.

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Citations of this work

The logic of Searle’s Chinese room argument.Robert I. Damper - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.

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