David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):111 - 116 (2007)
Jorn Sonderholm (2005) has argued that Simon Blackburn's commitment semantics for evaluative discourse is unable to explain the validity of simple inferences involving disjunction. This is true insofar as the basic rules which Blackburn suggests are not strong enough, but it is relatively simple to augment those rules so as to meet Sonderholm's challenge, whilst respecting the spirit of commitment semantics. One way of doing this is to add a reduction rule such that if accepting p commits one to inconsistent commitments, one is committed to accepting ¬p. Thus Sonderholm has not provided any reason to doubt the adequacy of commitment semantics to explain validity in evaluative discourse.
|Keywords||Frege-Geach Commitment semantics|
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References found in this work BETA
Jorn Sonderholm (2005). Why an Expressivist Should Not Commit to Commitment-Semantics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):403–409.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Sinclair (2011). Moral Expressivism and Sentential Negation. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):385-411.
Neil Sinclair (2009). Recent Work in Expressivism. Analysis 69 (1):136-147.
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