David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies (2):1-27 (2013)
There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factors on our folk notion of causation. In this paper, we argue that the strong claims found in the recent literature on causal cognition are overstated, as they are based on one narrow type of data about a particular type of causal cognition; the extant data do not warrant any wide-ranging conclusions about the pervasiveness of normative considerations in causal cognition. Of course, almost all empirical investigations involve some manner of ampliative inference, and so we provide novel empirical results demonstrating that there are types of causal cognition that do not seem to be influenced by moral considerations
|Keywords||Causal judgment Normative considerations Causal reasoning Causation Moral judgment|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Accentuate the Negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.
Mark Alicke, David Rose & Dori Bloom (2011). Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control. Journal of Philosophy 108 (12):670-696.
Aron K. Barbey & Steven A. Sloman (2007). Base-Rate Respect: From Ecological Rationality to Dual Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):241-254.
Marc J. Buehner & Jon May (2002). Knowledge Mediates the Timeframe of Covariation Assessment in Human Causal Induction. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (4):269 – 295.
Michelene T. H. Chi, Nicholas Leeuw, Mei‐Hung Chiu & Christian Lavancher (1994). Eliciting Self‐Explanations Improves Understanding. Cognitive Science 18 (3):439-477.
Citations of this work BETA
David Rose & David Danks (2012). Causation: Empirical Trends and Future Directions. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):643-653.
Similar books and articles
Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe (2009). Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Christian Jakob (2006). Hitchcock's (2001) Treatment of Singular and General Causation. Minds and Machines 16 (3):277-287.
David Danks (2013). Functions and Cognitive Bases for the Concept of Actual Causation. Erkenntnis 78 (1):111-128.
James Woodward (2011). Causal Perception and Causal Cognition. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Frederick S. Elett & David P. Ericson (1986). An Analysis of Probabilistic Causation in Dichotomous Structures. Synthese 67 (2):175-193.
Frederick S. Ellett Jr & David P. Ericson (1986). An Analysis of Probabilistic Causation in Dichotomous Structures. Synthese 67 (2):175 - 193.
Tomasz Bigaj (2012). Causation Without Influence. Erkenntnis 76 (1):1-22.
Johannes Persson (2002). Cause, Effect, and Fake Causation. Synthese 131 (1):129 - 143.
David Owens (1992). Causes and Coincidences. Cambridge University Press.
Richard Otte (1987). Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Craig Roxborough & Jill Cumby (2009). Folk Psychological Concepts: Causation. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):205-213.
Brad Weslake (forthcoming). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Uwe Meixner (2004). Causation in a New Old Key. Studia Logica 76 (3):343 - 383.
Luke Glynn (2013). Causal Foundationalism, Physical Causation, and Difference-Making. Synthese 190 (6):1017-1037.
Helen Beebee (2003). Seeing Causing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):257-280.
Added to index2011-10-31
Total downloads306 ( #1,661 of 1,693,218 )
Recent downloads (6 months)34 ( #4,430 of 1,693,218 )
How can I increase my downloads?