Demoralizing causation

Philosophical Studies:1-27 (2013)
Abstract
There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factors on our folk notion of causation. In this paper, we argue that the strong claims found in the recent literature on causal cognition are overstated, as they are based on one narrow type of data about a particular type of causal cognition; the extant data do not warrant any wide-ranging conclusions about the pervasiveness of normative considerations in causal cognition. Of course, almost all empirical investigations involve some manner of ampliative inference, and so we provide novel empirical results demonstrating that there are types of causal cognition that do not seem to be influenced by moral considerations
Keywords Causal judgment  Normative considerations  Causal reasoning  Causation  Moral judgment
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    View all 27 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe (2009). Cause and Norm. Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
    James Woodward (2011). Causal Perception and Causal Cognition. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    Brad Weslake (forthcoming). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Uwe Meixner (2004). Causation in a New Old Key. Studia Logica 76 (3):343 - 383.
    Helen Beebee (2003). Seeing Causing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):257-280.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-10-31

    Total downloads

    242 ( #1,268 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    50 ( #939 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.