Should we pass the buck?

My topic is the relation between the right and the good. I introduce it by relating some aspects of the debate between various British intuitionists in the first half of the present century. In Principia Ethica G. E. Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote ‘This use of “right”, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word’ . By the time he wrote his Ethics he seems to have weakened his position, and offers conduciveness to the good not as a definition of ‘right’ but as an account of the one and only property that makes acts right. Even if it be the only right-making property, conduciveness to the good will not be identical with the right-ness that it makes
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100006974
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Maarten Franssen (2006). The Normativity of Artefacts. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1):42-57.
Jonas Olson (2006). G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.

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Jonas Olson (2006). G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.

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