The Semiotic Ontology of Jonathan Edwards

Modern Schoolman 71 (4):285-304 (1994)
Jonathan Edwards' marginalization in modern philosophy stems from his refusal to endorse the predicational logic and substantialist ontology of the rationalist-empiricist debate. Instead, he appeals to a communicative, semiotic logic of propositions grounded in Stoic thought and thematized by Peter Ramus and his Puritan followers. That alternative logic displays an "ontology of supposition" that guarantees God's existence, justifies typological, magical, and even astrological inferences, undermines modernist dichotomies (e.g., between mind and matter), and invalidates efforts to speak of Edwards' thought in terms of idealism or immaterialism.
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DOI 10.5840/schoolman199471429
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Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). ``Jonathan Edwards on Hell&Quot. In Paul Helm & Oliver Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian. Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Co. 1-12.
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