“The story says that” operator in story semantics

Studia Logica 46 (1):73 - 86 (1987)
<span class='Hi'></span> In <span class='Hi'></span>[2]<span class='Hi'></span> a semantics for implication is offered that makes use of stories <span class='Hi'></span>— sets of sentences assembled under various constraints.<span class='Hi'></span> Sentences are evaluated at an actual world and in each member of a set of stories.<span class='Hi'></span> A sentence B is true in a story s just when B s.<span class='Hi'></span> A implies B iff for all stories and the actual world,<span class='Hi'></span> whenever A is true,<span class='Hi'></span> B is true.<span class='Hi'></span> In this article the first-order language of <span class='Hi'></span>[2]<span class='Hi'></span> is extended by the addition of the operator the story <span class='Hi'></span>..<span class='Hi'></span>. says that <span class='Hi'></span>..<span class='Hi'></span>.,<span class='Hi'></span> as in The story Flashman among the Redskins says that Flashman met Sitting Bull.<span class='Hi'></span> The resulting language is shown to be sound and complete.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00396906
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Richard Routley (1982). On What There is Not. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (2):151-177.

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