What (and how) was I thinking?: On memory of past thoughts

Intuitio 2 (2):103-107 (2009)
Abstract
Recent philosophical and psychological researches show that memory, not only stores information but also process it. It's possible one to have a meta-representational memory despite the propositional content and attitude of the present meta-representation being different from the propositional content and attitude of the thought that the meta-representation is causally derived. So, the question is: if we take for granted that this kind of memory doesn't require content or attitude identity, what is the permissible range of aberration between the original content and the memory content? This paper proposes some conditions to define when a present meta-representation has the status of memory of a past thought, despite the difference of content or attitude. The condition for diachronic content similarity is the same proposed by Sven Bernerker. The attitude condition is a new one: the attitude that S thinks (at t2) himself having taken (at t1) towards p and the attitude that S took at t1 towards p* are sufficiently similar if and only if they are the same or the attitude of the present thought is entailed by the past attitude.
Keywords Self-knowledge  Proposicional attitude  Memory
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Danilo Dantas, What (and how) was I thinking?: On memory of past thoughts
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Sanford Goldberg (2010). The Metasemantics of Memory. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):95-107.
Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605 - 632.
Richard Brown (2007). The Mark of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.
Mark McCullagh (2005). Motivating Inferentialism. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):77-84.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-11-04

Total downloads

40 ( #35,976 of 1,089,094 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #69,982 of 1,089,094 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.