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Anomaly-driven theory redesign: Computational philosophy of science experiments

Abstract I have been asked to discuss how computers have affected my work in philosophy. This paper discusses the use of artificial intelligence (AI) models to investigate both the representation of scientific knowledge and reasoning strategies for scientific change. The focus is on the reasoning strategies used to revise a theory, given an anomaly, which is a failed prediction of the theory.
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