Being With
Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):4–24 (2011)
| Abstract | What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in one another's presence, where the latter is a matter of second-personal standing or authority, as in the divine presence or in the king's presence. To be with someone is, therefore, to give the other second-personal standing, implicitly, to claim it for oneself and, thus, to enter into a relation of mutual accountability. Second-personal relating, I argue, requires a distinctive form of empathy, projective empathy, through which we imaginatively occupy others' perspectives and view ourselves as if from their point of view. Projective empathy is thus an essential constituent of “being with.” But it is not the only form of empathy that being with typically involves. Further, I discuss ways in which emotional contagion, affect attunement, as well as projective empathy typically enter into the complex psychological (and ethical) phenomenon of being with another person. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,865 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMark Coeckelbergh (2007). Who Needs Empathy? A Response to Goldie's Arguments Against Empathy and Suggestions for an Account of Mutual Perspective-Shifting in Contexts of Help and Care. Ethics and Education 2 (1):61-72.
Amy Coplan (2011). Will the Real Empathy Please Stand Up? A Case for a Narrow Conceptualization. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):40-65.
George B. Hogenson (1981). Depth Psychology, Death and the Hermeneutic of Empathy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 6 (1):67-90.
Peter Goldie (2011). Empathy with One's Past. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):193-207.
Toyoaki Nishida (forthcoming). Toward Mutual Dependency Between Empathy and Technology. AI and Society.
Aaron Simmons (forthcoming). In Defense of the Moral Significance of Empathy. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.) (2011). Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Jesse Prinz (2011). Against Empathy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.
Fritz Breithaupt (2012). A Three-Person Model of Empathy. Emotion Review 4 (1):84-91.
Dorothy M. Owens (1999). Hospitality to Strangers: Empathy and the Physician-Patient Relationship. OUP USA.
Nancy Eisenberg (2001). Distinctions Among Various Modes of Empathy-Related Reactions: A Matter of Importance in Humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):33-34.
Martin L. Hoffman (2001). How Automatic and Representational is Empathy, and Why. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):38-39.
Lawrence J. Hatab (2001). The Ecstatic Nature of Empathy. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:359-380.
Heidi L. Maibom (2009). Feeling for Others: Empathy, Sympathy, and Morality. Inquiry 52 (5):483-499.
Jesse Prinz (forthcoming). Is Empathy Necessary for Morality? In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-09-05Total downloads45 ( #25,048 of 556,772 )Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,403 of 556,772 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
