Comment on Searle: Philosophy and the Empirical Study of Consciousness

Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):320-333 (1993)
Abstract
I make three points about Searle’s philosophical work on consciousness and intentionality. First, I comment on Searle’s presentation and paper “The Problems of Consciousness.” I show that one of Searle’s philosophical claims about the relation between consciousness and intentionality appears to conflict with a demand he makes on acceptable empirical theories of the brain. Second, I argue that closer attention to the difference between conceptual connections and empirical connections corrects and improves Searle’s response to the so-called “Logical Connections” argument, the argument that claims that mental states cannot be causes, since they are conceptually connected with actions. Third, I give a formulation of his Chinese Room argument that avoids some tempting responses.
Keywords consciousness  intentionality  chinese room  logical connections argument  reasons and causes
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):32–73.
    Similar books and articles
    Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1994). What is the Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837-45.
    Larry Hauser (2003). Nixin' Goes to China. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. 123--143.
    Stevan Harnad (2001). What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument? In Michael A. Bishop & John M. Preston (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Oxford University Press.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-11-01

    Total downloads

    80 ( #13,382 of 1,088,753 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    35 ( #2,291 of 1,088,753 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.