David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):320-333 (1993)
I make three points about Searle’s philosophical work on consciousness and intentionality. First, I comment on Searle’s presentation and paper “The Problems of Consciousness.” I show that one of Searle’s philosophical claims about the relation between consciousness and intentionality appears to conflict with a demand he makes on acceptable empirical theories of the brain. Second, I argue that closer attention to the difference between conceptual connections and empirical connections corrects and improves Searle’s response to the so-called “Logical Connections” argument, the argument that claims that mental states cannot be causes, since they are conceptually connected with actions. Third, I give a formulation of his Chinese Room argument that avoids some tempting responses.
|Keywords||consciousness intentionality chinese room logical connections argument reasons and causes|
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Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):32–73.
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