Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral Sentimentalism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):134-141 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the role it accords to empathy. Finally, I suggest that these problems in moral psychology undermine Slote's metaethical argument for identifying rightness and wrongness with agential warmth and coldness in action.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Comments on Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism.Lori Watson - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):142-147.
Reply to Justin D'Arms and Lori Watson.Michael Slote - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):148-155.
In Defense of the Moral Significance of Empathy.Aaron Simmons - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):97-111.
Against Empathy.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.
Similarity versus familiarity: When empathy becomes selfish.Elias L. Khalil - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):41-41.
Mice in the Sink.Jessica Pierce - 2008 - Environmental Philosophy 5 (1):75-96.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-09-05

Downloads
159 (#110,379)

6 months
6 (#201,673)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Justin D'Arms
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Empathy.Karsten Stueber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Care Ethical Theory of Right Action.Steven Steyl - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):502-523.
Sympathetic Joy.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-11.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.
Upheavals of Thought.Martha Nussbaum - 2001 - Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (2):325-341.
Morals from motives.Michael Slote - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 8 references / Add more references