Moral obligation: Form and substance

Abstract
Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance. Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto obligation not to undermine one another's moral autonomy
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    References found in this work BETA
    Kurt Baier (1958). The Moral Point of View. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Stephen Darwall (2011). Justice and Retaliation. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):315-341.
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