David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):129-153 (2001)
How can an agent's desire or will give him reasons for acting? Not long ago, this might have seemed a silly question, since it was widely believed that all reasons for acting are based in the agent's desires. The interesting question, it seemed, was not how what an agent wants could give him reasons, but how anything else could. In recent years, however, this earlier orthodoxy has increasingly appeared wrongheaded as a growing number of philosophers have come to stress the action-guiding role of reasons in deliberation from the agent's point of view. What a deliberating agent has in view is rarely his own will or desires as such, even if taking something as a reason is intimately tied to desire. Someone who wants to escape a burning building does not evaluate her options by considering which is likeliest to realize what she wants or wills. She is focused, rather, on her desire's object: getting out alive. The fact that a successful route would realize something she wants is apt to strike her as beside the point or, at best, as a trivial bonus
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Jonathan Way (2010). Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Matthew Noah Smith (forthcoming). One Dogma of Philosophy of Action. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
David Sobel (2005). Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457.
Berislav Marušić (2010). The Desires of Others. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):385-400.
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