Russell, Presupposition, and the Vicious-Circle Principle

Abstract
Prompted by Poincaré, Russell put forward his celebrated vicious-circle principle (vcp) as the solution to the modern paradoxes. Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine, among others, have raised two salient objections against Russell's vcp. First, Gödel has claimed that Russell's various renderings of the vcp really express distinct principles and thus, distinct solutions to the paradoxes, a claim that gainsays one of Russell's positions on the nature of the solution to the paradoxes, namely, that such a solution be uniform. Secondly, Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine have protested that the vcp's proscription against impredicative specification is incompatible with a realistic conception of the domain of quantification, a conception that Russell certainly held. I examine Russell's vcp and defend it against these objections
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,346
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Michael Corrado (1974). Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle. International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (3):375-378.
J. van Heijendort (1974). Ontology and the Vicious-Circle Principle. International Studies in Philosophy 6:204-205.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-08-24

Total downloads

10 ( #141,181 of 1,096,621 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #265,701 of 1,096,621 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.