Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21 (2005)
|Abstract||‘Sentimentalism’ is an old-fashioned name for the philosophical suggestion that moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow upon human sentiments. This general idea has proven attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers with little else in common. Yet most sentimentalists say very little about the nature of the sentiments to which they appeal, and many seem prepared to enlist almost any object-directed pleasant or unpleasant state of mind as a sentiment. Furthermore, because battles between sentimentalism and its rivals have tended to be joined over large issues about realism and antirealism, or cognitivism and noncognitivism, some attractive reasons for adopting sentimentalism which are to some extent independent of these issues have been largely ignored in metaethical discussion. This paper aims to motivate sentimentalism, but also to circumscribe its ambitions by rendering explicit some tacit assumptions in moral psychology on which I think the most promising sentimentalism depends. I begin (in section one) by sketching the kind of sentimentalism that I want to defend. Then, in sections two and three, I articulate two positive arguments for a sentimentalist understanding of certain evaluative concepts. The arguments I consider have their origins in the writings of various other authors, I think, but neither they nor their consequences have been clearly articulated before. In section four, I explore just what the sentiments would have to be like in order to play the role required of them in the arguments I develop. I will suggest that these arguments supply a highly specific ‘job description’ for the states to which sentimentalism appeals. Hence, sentimentalists who want to use these arguments, or ones like them, cannot be as casual about what they mean by ‘sentiments’ as many have tended to be. I then investigate a category of ‘natural emotions’ that meets that job description rather nicely, and offer some reasons for doubting that more inclusive categories of....|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Antti Kauppinen (2013). Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
Michael B. Gill (2013). Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking. Hume Studies 37 (2):165-188.
Justin D'Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1–21.
Michael Slote (2010). Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford University Press.
John Skorupski (2010). Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):125 - 136.
Michael B. Gill (2007). Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty? Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.
Christine Tappolet (2012). Valeurs Et Émotions, les Perspectives du Néo-Sentimentalisme. Dialogue 51 (1):7-30.
Christine Tappolet (2011). Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Karen Jones (2006). Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
Michael Slote (2011). Reply to Justin D'Arms and Lori Watson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):148-155.
Fabian Dorsch (2007). Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations. Dialectica 61 (3):417-446.
Justin D'Arms (2011). Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral Sentimentalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):134-141.
Justin D.’Arms (2013). Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.
Added to index2010-09-14
Total downloads26 ( #53,550 of 722,742 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,742 )
How can I increase my downloads?