Online research in philosophy

Although science was once seen as the product of individual great men working in isolation, we now realize that, like any other creative activity, science is a highly social enterprise, influenced in subtle as well as obvious ways by the wider culture and values of its time. Scientific Knowledge is the first introduction to social studies of scientific knowledge. The authors, all noted for their contributions to science studies, have organized this book so that each chapter examines a key step in the process of doing science. Using case studies from cognitive science, physics, and biology to illustrate their descriptions and applications of the social study of science, they show how this approach provides a crucial perspective on how science is actually done. Scientific Knowledge will be of interest not only to those engaged in science studies, but also to anyone interested in the practice of science.

The history of genetics offers abundant material for the study of the influence of social factors in the development of science. Several of these factors are listed and briefly touched upon. Especial attention is paid to the interference of political power in the business of science, exemplified and analyzed in the tragic case of the Lysenko affair, which lead to the death of the best geneticists of Russia and the destruction of a whole and fruitful scientific community.

A general case about the insights and oversights of molecular genetics is argued for by considering two specific cases: the first concerns the bearing of molecular genetics on Mendelian genetics, and the second concerns the bearing of molecular genetics on the replicability of the genetic material. As in the first case, it is argued that Mendel's law of segregation cannot be explained wholly in terms of molecular genetics--the law demands evolutionary scrutiny as well. In the second case, it is argued that an account of the replicability of the genetic material in terms of molecular genetics is not entirely independent of evolutionary considerations, in the sense that it raises further evolutionary questions. The limitations of the molecular-genetic approach in these cases point to the limitations of that approach in general.

By using case studies from the history of science as evidence for its claims (and not, in contrast, merely to illustrate these claims), the philosophy of science can develop a more productive relation to its subject matter, the history of science. As might be expected, many problems involving the relation between theory and evidence in science reappear here as methodological problems about the relation between the philosophy of science and the history of science. For example, the most important of these difficulties involves the "contamination" of historical evidence by philosophical theories. The difficulty may be resolved as follows: the history of science is "theory-laden", but not necessarily with the solutions to the problems it poses for philosophers. As a result, case studies can be used to test our explanatory theories about science as long as those case studies have not yet been reconstructed by the theory they are meant to test. Furthermore, once an explanatory theory has been "well-supported", we can, using that theory, go on to reconstruct case studies. Such a theory would thereby take on the force of a normative claim about science, bypassing what has been viewed as a fundamental disjunction between the descriptive and normative function of theory. From this point of view, insistence on a single criterion of demarcation as a "ground" for philosophical claims is misguided, since it prejudges a still-open question--is science homogeneous?--that can only be answered by further investigation of science.

: What do appeals to case studies accomplish? Consider the dilemma: On the one hand, if the case is selected because it exemplifies the philosophical point, then it is not clear that the historical data hasn't been manipulated to fit the point. On the other hand, if one starts with a case study, it is not clear where to go from there—for it is unreasonable to generalize from one case or even two or three.

History and philosophy complement and overlap each other in subject matter, but the two disciplines exhibit conflict over methodology. Since Hempel's challenge to historians that they should adopt the covering law model of explanation, the methodological conflict has revolved around the respective roles of the general and the particular in each discipline. In recent years, the revival of narrativism in history, coupled with the trend in philosophy of science to rely upon case studies, joins the methodological conflict anew. So long as contemporary philosophy of science relies upon history's methodology to construct its case studies, it subjects itself to a paradoxical situation: the better the history, the worse the philosophy. An example of the methodological conflict is presented in the case of Antoine Lavoisier. This example also serves our ultimateconclusion, which is that distinctively philosophical methods of case-study design promise enhanced prescriptive powers for philosophy of science.

Science/Technoscience has moved to center stage in debates over change, power and justice in twenty-first century societies. This text provides a general framework for understanding, combining and applying the rich range of approaches that exist within sociology about science: in particular, the role (and limitations) of science in generating knowledge, and the relationship between scientific knowledge and social progress. Drawing on case studies such as the genetics and computing "revolutions," this is a clear, even-handed and comprehensive introduction to the field.

: Philosophers of science turned to historical case studies in part in response to Thomas Kuhn's insistence that such studies can transform the philosophy of science. In this issue Joseph Pitt argues that the power of case studies to instruct us about scientific methodology and epistemology depends on prior philosophical commitments, without which case studies are not philosophically useful. Here I reply to Pitt, demonstrating that case studies, properly deployed, illustrate styles of scientific work and modes of argumentation that are not well handled by currently standard philosophical analyses. I illustrate these claims with exemplary findings from case studies dealing with exploratory experimentation and with interdisciplinary cooperation across sciences to yield multiple independent means of access to theoretical entities. The latter cases provide examples of ways that scientists support claims about theoretical entities that are not available in work performed within a single discipline. They also illustrate means of correcting systematic biases that stem from the commitments of each discipline taken separately. These findings illustrate the transformative power of case study methods, allow us to escape from the horns of Pitt's "dilemma of case studies," and vindicate some of the post-Kuhn uses to which case studies have been put.

The last century saw two great revolutions in genetics the development of classic Mendelian theory and the discovery and investigation of DNA. Each fundamental scientific discovery in turn generated its own distinctive technology. These two case studies, examined in this text, enable the author to conduct a philosophical exploration of the relationship between fundamental scientific discoveries on the one hand, and the technologies that spring from them on the other. As such it is also an exercise in the philosophy of technology.