David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90 (2000)
Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is wrong to be envious. These two senses of ‘appropriate’ have much less in common than philosophers have supposed. Indeed, the distinction between propriety and correctness is crucial to understanding the distinctive role of the emotions in ethics. We argue here that an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel, and that various philosophical arguments are guilty of a systematic error which we term the moralistic fallacy
|Keywords||Appropriateness Emotion Ethics Fallacy Moral Theory|
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Citations of this work BETA
Luvell Anderson & Ernie Lepore (2013). Slurring Words. Noûs 47 (1):25-48.
Lucy Allais (2008). Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness. Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (1):33–68.
Mark Schroeder (2011). Holism, Weight, and Undercutting. Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
Zac Cogley (2013). Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
András Szigeti (2015). Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas. Dialectica 69 (1):1-22.
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