Individuals: An essay in revisionary metaphysics

Philosophical Studies 145 (1):35 - 67 (2009)
Abstract
We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals . These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least, there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world I call “generalism”.
Keywords Bundle theory  Generalism  Holism  Individuals  Velocity
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Sam Cowling (2013). Ideological Parsimony. Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.

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