David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy East and West 62 (1):1-15 (2012)
From the early modern period, Western epistemologists have often been concerned with a rigorous notion of epistemic justification, epitomized in the work of Descartes: properly held beliefs require insulation from extreme skepticism. To the degree that veridical cognitive states may be indistinguishable from non-veridical states, apparently veridical states cannot enjoy high-grade positive epistemic status. Therefore, a good believer begins from what are taken to be neutral, subjective experiences and reasons outward—hopefully identifying the kinds of appearances that properly link up to the world and those that do not. Good beliefs, beliefs that are justified (warranted, etc.), are those that a believer has ..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
William Fish, Disjunctivism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
William C. Fish (2008). Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 144--167.
Berit Brogaard (2011). Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):45-73.
Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press 205--224.
Juan Comesaña (2005). Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
Huaping Wang (2011). Disjunctivism and Skepticism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):443-464.
Harold Langsam (2014). A Defense of McDowell's Response to the Sceptic. Acta Analytica 29 (1):43-59.
Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
Joel Feldman (2005). Vasubandhu's Illusion Argument and the Parasitism of Illusion Upon Veridical Experience. Philosophy East and West 55 (4):529-541.
Louise Antony (2011). The Openness of Illusions. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
John McDowell (2011). Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
Nick Zangwill (2006). Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint. In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell Pub. 263--281.
Matthew R. Dasti (2008). Testimony, Belief Transfer, and Causal Irrelevance: Reflections From India's Nyaya School. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (4):281-299.
Added to index2012-01-03
Total downloads47 ( #85,419 of 1,789,835 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #317,270 of 1,789,835 )
How can I increase my downloads?