McGinn's materialism and epiphenomenalism

Analysis 61 (2):136-139 (2001)
Colin McGinn urged that while a brain state P explains consciousness, a conception P is cognitively inaccessible to us. This paper argues that McGinn's argument for his form of materialism is committed to P being epiphenomenal or causally inert relative to such things as the movements of our bodies. As a result, McGinn's materialism creates a duality in the brain and thereby faces the same problem of epiphenomenalism which plagues the Cartesian dualist
Keywords Epiphenomenalism  Materialism  Metaphysics  Mcginn, C
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00283
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