An argument against dispositionalist HOT

Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476 (2006)
In this paper we present a two-stage argument against Peter Carruthers' theory of phenomenal consciousness. The first stage shows that Carruthers' main argument against first-order representational theories of phenomenal consciousness applies with equal force against his own theory. The second stage shows that if Carruthers can escape his own argument against first-order theories, it will come at the cost of wedding his theory to certain unwelcome implausibilities. discusses Carruthers' argument against first-order representationalism. presents Carruthers' theory of consciousness. presents our argument against Carruthers' theory. sums up.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080600729348
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Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.

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