An argument against dispositionalist HOT

Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper we present a two-stage argument against Peter Carruthers' theory of phenomenal consciousness. The first stage shows that Carruthers' main argument against first-order representational theories of phenomenal consciousness applies with equal force against his own theory. The second stage shows that if Carruthers can escape his own argument against first-order theories, it will come at the cost of wedding his theory to certain unwelcome implausibilities. discusses Carruthers' argument against first-order representationalism. presents Carruthers' theory of consciousness. presents our argument against Carruthers' theory. sums up.
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1978). Troubles with Functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
Peter Carruthers (1998). Natural Theories of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):203-22.

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