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- Martin Davies, Anne Aimola Davies & Max Coltheart (2005). Anosognosia and the Two-Factor Theory of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):241-57.Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to the right hemisphere of the brain. In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with anosognosia for hemiplegia. But we shall also use the term ‘anosognosia’ in an inclusive way to encompass lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of any impairment. Indeed, in the construction ‘anosognosia for X’, X might even be anosognosia for some Y.In my reading list | Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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| | Other links: ncbi.nlm.nih.gov ingentaconnect.com | Scholar | More.. Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. Firstly, the abnormalities of cognition which initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Secondly, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider eight) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive (...)
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We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...)
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| | Other links: muse.jhu.edu | Scholar | More.. 1923; Young, this volume); the Cotard delusion (Cotard, 1882; Berrios and Luque, 1995; Young, this volume); the Fregoli delusion (Courbon and Fail, 1927; de Pauw, Szulecka and Poltock, 1987; Ellis, Whitley and Luaute´, 1994); the delusion of mirrored-self misidentifi- cation (Foley and Breslau, 1982; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion of reduplicative param- nesia (Benson, Gardner and Meadows, 1976; Breen et al., this volume); a delusion sometimes found in patients suffering from unilateral neglect (Bisiach, 1988); and the delusions of (...)
Some otherwise rational people appear to believe strange things. Sometimes people believe that someone, usually a near relative or member of their family - often their spouse - has been replaced by an impostor. Sometimes people believe that they are dead. These two delusions – known as the Capgras and Cotard delusion respectively – are instances of monothematic delusions, for they are limited to very specific topics. Other monothematic delusions involve the delusion that one is being followed by known people (...)
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| Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr hal.archives-ouvertes.fr philosophy.ox.ac.uk muse.jhu.edu | Scholar | More..
| | Other links: hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr hal.archives-ouvertes.fr philosophy.ox.ac.uk muse.jhu.edu | Scholar | More.. In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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| | Other links: philosophy.ox.ac.uk blackwell-synergy.com | Scholar | More.. Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with (...)
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