An Alternative to Relativism

Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37 (2010)
Some moral disagreements are so persistent that we suspect they are deep: we would disagree even when we have all relevant information and no one makes any mistakes (this is also known as faultless disagreement). The possibility of deep disagreement is thought to drive cognitivists toward relativism, but most cognitivists reject relativism. There is an alternative. According to divergentism, cognitivists can reject relativism while allowing for deep disagreement. This view has rarely been defended at length, but many philosophers have implicitly endorsed its elements. I will defend it.
Keywords cognitive command  deep disagreement  disagreement  disagreement epistemology  ethics  faultless disagreement  metaethical relativism  moral disagreement  relativism  weak cognitivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/philtopics201038212
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive John K. Davis, An Alternative to Relativism
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Max Kölbel (2004). Faultless Disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
Ralph Wedgwood (2010). The Moral Evil Demons. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press
Dan López de Sa (2007). The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):269 – 279.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

238 ( #4,527 of 1,725,806 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

36 ( #30,978 of 1,725,806 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.