David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54 (1984)
My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are not intended, examine the two senses of "desire," distinguish intending from being willing, and relate intending to a variety of other propositional at? titudes.
|Keywords||intention desire beleif|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2014). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Niko Kolodny (2008). The Myth of Practical Consistency. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Joshua Shepherd (2013). The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
Kirk Ludwig (2007). Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics. Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
Leslie E. Sekerka & Richard P. Bagozzi (2007). Moral Courage in the Workplace: Moving to and From the Desire and Decision to Act. Business Ethics 16 (2):132–149.
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