Online research in philosophy

I discuss the justification of political violence even within democracies. I define ?violence? and indicate how its evaluative force sometimes has conceptually distorting effects. Though acts of violence are at least prima facie wrong, circumstances can arise where, even in democracies, some of them are morally justified. To establish this, three paradigm cases of non?revolutionary political violence are examined. The question is then discussed whether revolutionary violence is ever justified as a means of establishing or promoting human freedom and happiness. I state the conditions which must be satisfied for such violence to be justified and argue that sometimes these conditions have been satisfied. Finally I argue that discussions of violence are frequently confused by ideological mystification and attempt to go some way towards revealing the sources of that mystification.

The Subject of Violence is a critical investigation of violence and its subjectifying capacities. It both relies on and explores the work of Hannah Arendt. At its background are feminist concerns, but also concerns with violence that press against the feminist problematic and push its boundaries. The book's main project is ethico-political _understanding_ and, therefore, it is also about finding an ethico-political language for violence that escapes the standard idioms in which violence is spoken.

Introduction: Reflections on violence -- Schmitt's challenge (Clausewitz, Schmitt) -- On violence (Arendt, Sartre) -- On the line (Junger, Heidegger) -- Violence and responsibility (Patoka) -- Conclusion: Six problems of violence.

Luther, A. R. The articulated unity of being in Scheler's phenomenology : basic drive and spirit.--Funk, R. L. Thought, values, and action.--Emad, P. Person, death, and world.--Smith, F. J. Peace and pacifism.--Scheler, M. Metaphysics and art.--Scheler, M. The meaning of suffering.

Basing its understanding on the two uses of the notion of violence in Honneth’s theory of recognition, this paper aims at developing a framework for the analysis of the thesis of the moral justification of political violence, whenever forms of political violence can be defined as legitimate struggles of recognition. Its contention is that the requalification of some forms of collective violence as recognition conflicts makes it possible to establish a hierarchy of justification for forms of violence which cannot be constructed through a priori criteria, but should rather be the result of a descriptive social philosophy enquiry.

For Gianni Vattimo, the renunciation of violence is the starting point for constructing a post foundational politics. So far, criticism of Vattimo’s argument has focused on his larger commitment to metaphysical nihilism and whether the renunciation of violence is a thicker principle than his post foundational philosophy can support. I argue that Vattimo’s renunciation of violence can also be criticized for two other reasons. First, Vattimo attempts to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable uses of violence through an under developed idea of self-defense. Second, despite his attention to the political and philosophical impact of mass communications technology, Vattimo ignores emerging technological challenges to our understanding of violence. Nonetheless, I argue that Vattimo’s renunciation can still serve as a useful starting point for contemporary political thinking. What Vattimo’s logic shows is that we can enhance the moral standing of democracy by decisively detaching its practices and institutions from historical artifacts of political violence.

The meanings of violence, political violence, and terrorism are briefly discussed. I then consider the responsibilities of the media, especially television, with respect to political violence, including such questions as how violence should be described, and whether the media should cover terrorism. I argue that the media should contribute to decreasing political violence through better coverage of arguments for and against political dissidents'' views, and especially through more and better treatment of nonviolent means of influencing political processes. Since commercial pressures routinely conflict with media responsibility, I argue that society should liberate substantial amounts of culture from such pressures.

The politicization of ontology -- Foundational violence -- Dangerous animals -- The politics of gendered violence -- Political life -- The management of state violence -- The political ontology of neoliberalism -- Violence and neoliberal governmentality -- Terror and political spirituality.