David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):563 - 577 (2012)
We sometimes decide what to do by applying moral principles to cases, but this is harder than it looks. Principles are more general than cases, and sometimes it is hard to tell whether and how a principle applies to a given case. Sometimes two conflicting principles seem to apply to the same case. To handle these problems, we use a kind of judgment to ascertain whether and how a principle applies to a given case, or which principle to follow when two principles seem to conflict. But what do we discern when we make such judgments—that is, what makes such judgments correct? The obvious answer is that they are made correct by whatever makes other moral judgments correct. However, that cannot be right, for a principle can be inconsistent with morality yet still apply in a particular way to a given case. If the principle is inconsistent with morality, then morality cannot be what we discern when we judge whether and how that principle applies to a given case. I offer an alternative account of what makes such judgments correct
|Keywords||Applied ethics Cases Casuistry Judgment Moral practice Practical judgment Principles Specification Moral Principles|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
Lawrence Blum (1991). Moral Perception and Particularity. Ethics 101 (4):701-725.
Gerald Dworkin (2006). Theory, Practice, and Moral Reasoning. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 624--644.
Bernard Gert (2006). Bioethics: A Systematic Approach. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Gert (1998). Morality: Its Nature and Justification. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jeffery Smith & Wim Dubbink (2011). Understanding the Role of Moral Principles in Business Ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly 21 (2):205-231.
Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Usable Moral Principles. In Vojko Strahovnik, Matjaz Potrc & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge.
Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.
Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser (2006). The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment. Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.
David E. Boeyink (1992). Casuistry: A Case-Based Methods for Journalists. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 7 (2):107 – 120.
David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (2000). Unprincipled Ethics. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Clarendon Press.
Jakob Elster (2011). How Outlandish Can Imaginary Cases Be? Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (3):241-258.
Andrew Sneddon (2009). Alternative Motivation: A New Challenge to Moral Judgment Internalism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):41 – 53.
Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.) (2000). Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2012). ‘Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism’. Theory and Research in Education 10 (1):3--25.
Mark Kuczewski (1998). Casuistry and Principlism: The Convergence of Method in Biomedical Ethics. [REVIEW] Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 19 (6):509-524.
Onora O'neill (2009). Applied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public Policy. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (3):219-230.
Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.
Albert R. Jonsen (1991). Casuistry as Methodology in Clinical Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 12 (4).
Added to index2011-10-26
Total downloads26 ( #56,514 of 1,088,398 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #17,280 of 1,088,398 )
How can I increase my downloads?